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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The names of the parties are set forth in the caption of this
brief.

Defendant J.R. Simplot is not a party to the appeal.
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JURISDICTION
Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment ("Savage") was granted
summary judgment on May 25, 1994. The court's order was certified
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54(b) as final and appealable.

R. 178-179.

Plaintiff appeals pursuant to U.R.A.P. 3.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court correctly grant summary judgment

where Plaintiff failed to show any evidence that the contract
between Plaintiff and Defendant was adhesive in nature or that it
was unconscionable and the plain terms required Plaintiff to
indemnify Defendant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous they
may be ruled on as a matter of law by the court. Colonial Leasing
v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). Upon review
of a granting of a motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court
applies the same standard as applied by the trial court. Briggs v.
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff
Defendant
equipment.

Bruce

Savage

Boyd,

Scaffold

a painting
&

Equipment

contractor,
to

rent

approached
scaffolding

In connection with the rental, Plaintiff executed a

1

rental agreement with Defendant.

One of the provisions of the

agreement required Boyd to indemnify and defend Savage against all
claims asserted against Defendant arising out of the use of the
equipment, including Defendant's own negligence.
Plaintiff and a co-worker were later injured when a catwalk on
top of the building was improperly used by the Plaintiff as an
anchor for the scaffolding and failed. Plaintiff sued Defendant in
state court.

The injured co-worker sued Defendant in a similar

action in Federal District Court for the District of Utah.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Savage brought its motion for summary

judgment

seeking to have the indemnity provision of the rental agreement
enforced,

requiring

Plaintiff

Boyd

to

defend

and

indemnify

Defendant in this action as well as the federal court action.
The Plaintiff acknowledged that he had rented scaffolding from
Defendant on numerous occasions, that he had executed the document
and had initialed that he had read the entire document.

Further,

Plaintiff admitted at oral argument that the terms of the document
were clear and unambiguous. However, Plaintiff argued that because
the contract contained hidden provisions it was adhesive and was
not enforceable against Plaintiff because he did not intend to be
bound by an indemnity agreement.

2

The

trial

court

requested

additional

briefing

on

the

requirements for establishing a contract of adhesion in Utah and
what the effect of showing an adhesion contract establishes. After
supplemental

briefing by both parties, the court

ruled that

Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case that the
contract was one of adhesion.

The court then examined the

agreement and, coupled with Plaintiff's acknowledgment that the
terms were clear and unambiguous, held that, as a matter of law,
the contract's indemnity provision was enforceable.

The court

ordered Plaintiff to indemnify Defendant in the state court and
federal court actions pursuant to the plain terms of the agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The material undisputed facts set forth by Defendant

Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. to the trial court below were as
follows:
1.
On May 17, 1991 Bruce Boyd dba Bruce's
Industrial Painting Co. (hereinafter BIPCO) entered into
a rental agreement with Savage Scaffold & Equipment Co.
for certain scaffolding equipment.
(See Rental
Agreement.)
R. 109.
2.
On July 5, 1991 Boyd alleges that while he was
engaged in his employment as a painter, the scaffolding
failed and he fell approximately 60 feet to the ground.
(Boyd Complaint at 5.)
3.
Boyd alleges further that the accident resulted
from a breach by Savage of its duty to adequately direct,
instruct, and warn Boyd with respect to the dangers
3

inherent in, and with respect to, the proper method for
the use of the equipment. (Boyd Complaint at 7).
4.
Robert J. Kane and Beverly Kane allege the same
in a suit by them, against Savage, filed in Utah's
Federal District Court. (Kane Amended Complaint at 8-9.)
5.
Paragraph 15 of the Rental Agreement of May 17,
1991 provides that the lessee will defend and indemnify
the lessor. (See Rental Agreement.)
R. 109.
6.
Boyd received the indemnity agreement, signed
it and additionally initialled it acknowledging that he
read and agreed to the indemnity provision of paragraph
15.
(See Rental Agreement; Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.'s Request for
Admissions at 2.)
7.
Boyd admits that he has rented equipment from
Savage approximately 15 times. (See Plaintiff's Response
to Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.'s Request
for Admissions at 1; Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's
Interrogatories at 11.)
8.
Boyd admits that he received a copy of the
Rental Agreement following his execution and initialling
of the document. (See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant
Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.'s Request for
Admissions.)
9.
Boyd has received notice of the intent on the
part of Savage to enforce the indemnification provision.
(See Tender of Defense letter mailed February 17, 1993;
January 13, 1993 letter to Dan Gibbons, counsel for Mr.
Boyd.)
R. 65-67.
2.

In opposition to Defendant's statement of undisputed

material facts, Plaintiff asserted the following as disputed issues
of fact:
4

1.
Paragraph 6 of the defendant's statement of
facts is incorrect. The initialing on the front of the
Defendant's form rental agreement does not indicate that
the plaintiff read and agreed to the indemnity provision
of paragraph 15.
The initialing is in regard to
paragraph 16. (See Rental Agreement.)
2.
The Rental Agreement is a form contract
prepared
by Savage Scaffold
& Equipment, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "Savage") without input from
or negotiation with the individuals to whom they rent
equipment.
3.
The plaintiff never had a discussion with any
individual at Savage with regard to the terms of the
indemnity provision found on two of the back sheets of
the four page contract.
(See Boyd's affidavit,
paragraphs 9 and 11.)
4.
The indemnity provision is not clearly
presented to the renter of the equipment in that it is
hidden on back sheets inside the four page document. (An
exemplar of the contract will be brought for the court's
review at the time of the oral argument. The defendant
has refused to provide additional exemplars to the
plaintiff.)
R. 86-87.
3.

The Rental Agreement

provides on the first page a

separate paragraph set off in capital letters which provides as
follows:
I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE AND
AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT
BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER OR OTHER
AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY CONSTITUTE LESSEE'S
AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE PARAGRAPH 20).
Plaintiff initialled the document immediately below this statement.
R. 78.
5

4.

The Rental Agreement also provides on the front page in

capital letters and in contrasting red type, surrounded by a box:
LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15).
R. 109.
5.

Paragraph 15 of the Rental Agreement provides:

15. INDEMNIFICATION: LESSEE SHALL INDEMNIFY AND DEFEND LESSOR
AGAINST AND HOLD LESSOR HARMLESS FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS,
ACTIONS, SUITS PROCEEDINGS, COSTS, EXPENSES, DAMAGES AND
LIABILITIES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH:
(1) RELATE TO INJURY OR TO DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, OR
BODILY INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DISEASE OR DEATH OF ANY
PERSON (INCLUDING EMPLOYEES OF LESSEE), AND
(2) ARE CAUSED, OR CLAIMED TO BE CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN
PART BY THE EQUIPMENT LEASED HEREIN OR BY THE LIABILITY
OR CONDUCT (INCLUDING ACTIVE, PASSIVE, PRIMARY OR
SECONDARY) OF LESSOR, ITS AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES OR ANYONE
FOR WHOSE ACTS ANY OF THEM MAY BE LIABLE. THE PARTIES
AGREE THAT LESSOR SHALL ONLY BE LIABLE OR RESPONSIBLE FOR
ACTIONS OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT.
LESSEE SHALL, AT ITS OWN COST AND EXPENSE, DEFEND
LESSOR AGAINST ALL SUITS OR PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED BY
ANYONE IN WHICH LESSOR IS A NAMED PARTY FOR WHICH LESSOR
IS ALLEGED TO BE LIABLE OR RESPONSIBLE AS A RESULT OF OR
ALLEGING OUT OF THE EQUIPMENT, OR ANY ALLEGED ACT OR
OMISSION BY LESSOR, AND LESSEE SHALL BE LIABLE AND
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL COSTS, EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED IN SUCH DEFENSE AND OR SETTLEMENT, JUDGMENT OR
OTHER RESOLUTION. IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH AN ACTION IS
COMMENCED NAMING LESSOR AS A PARTY LESSOR MAY ELECT TO
DEFEND SAID ACTION ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND LESSEE AGREES
THAT IT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL COSTS, EXPENSES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED BY LESSOR IN SUCH DEFENSE.
PURPOSE OF THIS CLAUSE: IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS CLAUSE TO
SHIFT THE RISK OF ALL CLAIMS RELATING TO THE LEASED PROPERTY
TO THE LESSEE DURING THE ENTIRE TERM OF THIS LEASE.
R. 109A.
6

6.

Plaintiff also admits receiving a copy of the Agreement

from the Defendant at the time he rented the equipment.
7.

The court was provided an exemplar copy of the rental

agreement.
8.

R. 83A.

R. 109-112A.

At the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

to Enforce

the Terms of the Indemnity Agreement,

the court

questioned Plaintiff's counsel on whether the Plaintiff claimed
that the terms of the contract itself were ambiguous or unclear.
Plaintiff's counsel responded negatively as follows:
The Court:

What's ambiguous about that agreement?

Mr. Dunn:

We are not looking to the ambiguity. We are
going to the step before that, the language
itself. We do not maintain it's ambiguous.
The idea of this being an adhesion contract —
well, basically there's a hidden trap in this
type of agreement and that isf there can be no
intention found in the facts and circumstances
of Mr. Boyd signing it. The mere fact that he
has entered —

The Court:

Is it fair to say that is the entirety of your
challenge to this agreement, and that is, that
it's a contract of adhesion?

Mr. Dunn:

That's correct, your Honor.

R. 196-197.
9.

At the hearing on Defendant's Motion, the court requested

the parties to brief the law in Utah regarding contracts of
adhesion, and the judicial presumptions and burdens associated with
adhesion contracts.

The court stated:
7

The Court:

What I'm going to do is ask each of you to
submit memorandums on the same date so that we
don't have crossfire. There is case law, not
on the issue of contracts of adhesion in the
context of indemnity contracts, maybe, but
case law generally on what it takes to
overcome motions for summary judgment when the
claim is made generally that there is a
contract of adhesion.
And that's what I would like you to analysis
for me. Because that's all that's in issue
that Mr. Dunn has conceded that is his claim
here. And I think I need that, and I don't
think I have it now.

R. 203.
In effect, the only issue before the court was whether
Plaintiff had produced disputed material facts on whether the
contract was one of adhesion and what the effect of an adhesion
contract is on enforceability of the indemnity provision.
10.

After supplemental briefing on the issue, the district

court, by minute entry, ruled:
Defendant Savage has moved for Summary Judgment on its
indemnity contract with plaintiff. There is no evidence that
the scaffolding was leased on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or
that plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position.
As a consequence, there is no evidence to support a legal
conclusion that the contract or the provision in question are
contracts of adhesion. See, System Concepts. Inc., v. Dixon.
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983).
See Appendix, Minute Entry.
11.

In its order, the court specifically held that Plaintiff

had failed to present admissible material evidence of adhesion, or
that the contract was one of unconscionable terms and, therefore,
8

the contract could not be voided, but would be enforced as written.
R. 152.
12.

Judge Murphy then ordered that the indemnity agreement

was to be enforced according to its terms as a matter of law, and
granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

R. 152.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff failed to raise evidence of a prima facie case of
unenforceable adhesion contract.

In Utah, a contract will be

considered adhesive where the plaintiff shows a form contract is
offered to a party in a disadvantageous bargaining position on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In this case, Plaintiff established only that the contract was
a form contract prepared by the Defendant.

However, Plaintiff

failed to forward any evidence that he occupied a disadvantageous
bargaining position or that the contract was offered to him on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Plaintiff further admitted in oral argument that the terms of
the contract were clear and unambiguous. As a result, even if the
agreement is otherwise adhesive, it is subject only to scrutiny of
the terms, with ambiguity resolved in favor of the Plaintiff.

It

does not itself render the agreement voidable.
Finally, Plaintiff

failed

to

forward

evidence

that the

contract was procedurally or substantively unconscionable. At the
9

outset, Plaintiff's failure to establish disparate bargaining power
is fatal to a claim of adhesion contract or unconscionability.
Further, the risk shifting of indemnity agreements is acceptable as
a matter of public policy and there is no evidence of onerous or
deceptive

business

unconscionability.
evidence

of

practice

to

Plaintiff's

adhesion

or

support

failure to

unconscionability

a

claim

forward
made

of

probative

the

court's

determination that Defendant is entitled to indemnification proper
as a matter of law.

The district court's judgment should be

affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE A ^GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
THAT THE CONTRACT WAS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION.
A.

Prima Facie Elements Of A Contract Of Adhesion

The Utah Supreme Court in System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon. 669
P.2d 421 (Utah 1983), listed three elements which must be present
for a contract to be considered an adhesion contract under Utah
law. The Court stated, "A contract is usually considered adhesive
which is prepared in a standardized form and presented on a takeit-or-leave-it basis to one occupying a disadvantageous bargaining
position."

Id. at 429.

Thus, Plaintiff's burden below was to forward material facts
showing that the contract (1) was prepared on a standardized form,
10

(2) was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and (3) that he
occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position.
at 429.

System Concepts,

His failure to make a showing of any one of the elements

defeats his claim that the contract is one of adhesion.
As will be shown below, the district court was not presented
with any disputed material facts indicating that the contract was
adhesive according to Utah law.

The court, therefore, properly

concluded that the contract was not a contract of adhesion as a
matter of law and that it was enforceable according to its terms.
B.

Plaintiff Failed To Bring Forward Evidence To Establish
That The Indemnity Agreement Is An Adhesion Contract.

In this case, Plaintiff failed to bring to the district court
genuine issues of material fact with respect to at least two
elements of a prima facie case of adhesion.

While Plaintiff did

allege that the contract was a form contract, that fact alone is
insufficient to establish the contract's adhesive nature.1

More

importantly, for purposes of this appeal, there was no claim or
evidence below that the contract was presented on a take-it-orleave-it basis to the Plaintiff, or, most significantly, that the
Plaintiff

occupied

a

disadvantageous

bargaining

position.

Plaintiff's statement of disputed issues of fact and his Affidavit
1

"That the terms of a contract are embodied in a written
form developed by one of the parties does not render it either a
contract of adhesion or unenforceable." Resource Management Co. v.
Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1048 (Utah 1985).

11

in Opposition to Summary Judgment fail to assert evidence of either
factor.

See, R. 86-87.

Plaintiff merely brought evidence that the contract was a form
contract prepared by Savage. See, supra. Statement of Facts 2 (2);
see, also, R. 87. While this asserted fact may have satisfied the
first factor of his claim, Plaintiff's complete failure of evidence
of the other two factors properly mandated judgment in favor of
Defendant.
1.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE OCCUPIED AN UNEQUAL
BARGAINING POSITION.

In Utah, evidence of an unequal bargaining position is an
essential element of a claim of adhesion contract.

See System

Concepts, at 492. For example, in System Concepts, the defendant,
Dixon, was presented an employment agreement by her employer and
was told that her continued employment was conditioned upon signing
the contract. She signed the contract and later sought to void it
because of its allegedly adhesive nature. The court rejected her
claim stating that despite the employer-employee relationship and
the fact that the employer made signing the contract mandatory, she
failed to show disparate bargaining position between the parties.
Id. at 429.
In stark contrast to the claims in System Concepts, Plaintiff
here does not occupy a special relationship with Defendant and the
execution of the contract was not a condition of continued business
12

dealings.

Instead,

Plaintiff

was

a

completely

independent

commercial contractor who was free to accept or reject any proposal
or contract placed in front of him. See, supra. Statement of Facts
no. 1, Statement of Undisputed Facts no. 1; R. 65.
Further, Plaintiff has completely failed to assert or show any
facts which would place him under duress or in a situation that
would leave him no choice but to enter into the agreement according
to whatever

terms were dictated by Defendant.

Statement of Facts no. 2; R. 66.

See, supra,

Instead, he merely claims that

there was no discussion of the contracts terms.

See, supra,

Statement of Facts no. 2 (3); R. 87. Because Plaintiff failed to
show disparate bargaining position existed, he failed to show an
adhesion contract as a matter of law.

The district court was

correct in granting Defendant Savage summary judgment.
2.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS FORCED TO
ENTER THE CONTRACT ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS.

Utah law also requires a party seeking to void a contract on
grounds of its adhesive nature to show that the contract was
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. System Concepts, at 429.
This factor, by its nature, implies that the party offering the
contract refuses to modify or amend terms considered by the other
party to be onerous.

Consequently, the other party has no real

choice but to accept or forego the service or contract altogether.
Id.
13

The fact that no negotiation takes place does not render a
contract a take-it-or-leave-it deal. After all, many parties will
make a proposed deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That, in and
of itself, does not render the bargain void.

The danger of

adhesion contracts arises where the party dictating the terms is
the only source of the product or service and there is a danger
that even onerous or unfair terms would be accepted by a consumer
in

order

to

obtain

the product

or

service.

See, Resource

Management v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985).
In response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff did not present
any disputed

fact whereby

it could be inferred that he was

presented with onerous terms and was forced to take the terms as
presented
Plaintiffs

or

be

unable

Opposition

to

and

obtain

Affidavit

scaffolding
merely

state

equipment.
that

no

bargaining took place. See. R. 92-94; R. 86-87. This is a far cry
from stating that Defendant refused to bargain when Plaintiff
proposed different terms.

Cf. Resource Management, at 1042-46.

The undisputed facts do show, however, that Plaintiff, as a
commercial painting contractor, was in an equal position to demand
different terms as a condition of patronizing the Defendant with
his business.

See, supra. Statement of Facts, 1; R. 63.

The

parties occupied relatively equal positions in the commercial
setting in which they operated. The Plaintiff presents no evidence
14

that he attempted to negotiate terms or, more importantly, that
Defendant

refused

to negotiate with

him over terms.

As a

consequence, no finding that the contract was offered on a take-itor-leave-it basis could be made by the court.

See, R. 86-87; R.

92-94.
Because Plaintiff failed to raise issues of material fact
showing that the contract at issue was an adhesion contract based
on his failure to show a take-it-or-leave-it arrangement, the court
properly granted summary judgment to Defendant as a matter of law.
C.

Even If The Contract Is Adhesive, That Alone Does Not
Render The Agreement Void Or Voidable Because Plaintiff
Failed To Assert Or Show Ambiguity In The Terms.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions on appeal and in the court
below, a mere showing that the contract is adhesive in nature does
not, alone, constitute grounds for its voidance. The Utah Supreme
Court's analysis of insurance contracts is instructive in this area
because, according to the Court, insurance policies are a "classic
example of an adhesion contract." U.S.F.&G. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519
(Utah

1993).

Utah

courts do not

simply

rewrite

or excuse

performance of an insurance contract based on the mere fact that a
policy is an adhesion contract.

Instead, the courts apply a

different scrutiny to the terms of the contract in light of the
relationship of the parties.

15

For example, in the recent case of Allen v. Prudential
Property and Cas. Co,. 839 P.2d 798, 803 (Utah 1992), the court
stated, "the fact that an insurance contract is adhesive is no
reason, in itself, to enforce what might be found to be the
reasonable expectations of the insured when those expectations
conflict with the plain terms of the policy,"

The Allen. court

specifically declined the invitation to rewrite the clear and
unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract even though it was
an adhesion contract and the plaintiff argued lack of intent to be
bound by the limitations set forth in the policy.

Allen. at 804.

Instead, the Allen, court upheld the practice of applying a
stricter scrutiny in enforcing the terms of adhesive agreements,
resolving

ambiguity

and

inconsistency

in favor of the party

occupying the inferior bargaining position.

See, id. at 805-806.

At the hearing on summary judgment in this matter, Plaintiff
acknowledged

that

the terms of the contract

were clear and

unambiguous.

R. 196. Therefore, even assuming that the contract

was adhesive, Plaintiff has failed to show that its terms are
ambiguous

or unenforceable even under the strictest

construction.

judicial

Cf. Pickover v. Smiths Management Corp., 771 P.2d

664, 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Plaintiff's claim that he should

not be bound by the contract because he never intended to enter
into an indemnity agreement is not a sufficient basis for having
16

the plain terms rewritten or performance excused.

Cf., Allen. at

806. Plaintiff's arguments excusing performance based on his lack
of intent must fail.
Plaintiff's admission that the terms are clear and unambiguous
is fatal to his claim of voidance.

Merely showing that the

contract was adhesive does not render the indemnity provision
voidable by the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff failed to show that the

contract was adhesive. That fact, coupled with his failure to show
that the terms of the agreement were ambiguous, makes the district
court's judgment proper as a matter of law.

Summary judgment

should be affirmed.
D.

Where Plaintiff Fails To Show Disparate Bargaining
Position, The Claim Of Adhesion Or Unconscionability Is
Simply Inapplicable.

According to Utah law, where bargaining power is equal and
does not invoke flagrantly unjust provisions or agreements, "the
doctrines regarding contracts of adhesion and unconscionability are
inapplicable." White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983). In
this case, it has been shown that Plaintiff failed to show any
evidence that the parties occupied unequal bargaining positions.
The undisputed facts in the record below indicate that both parties
were experienced businesses operating in a commercial setting.
Plaintiff

admits,

for example, that over the period

of his

relationship with defendant he rented scaffolding on approximately
17

fifteen occasions.

See, R. 83.

Cf^_, White, at 1300 (plaintiff

dealt with defendant in commercial setting on numerous occasions).
As a result, this Court does not need to address Plaintiff's
additional arguments regarding unconscionability of the terms of
the contract.

See, White, at 1300.

This Court may

be satisfied

that risk allocation among

commercial businesses is recognized and acceptable in this state.
CjU Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).

The

Plaintiff's cries of unfairness of the indemnity agreement do not
rise to a level that demonstrates the provisions are flagrantly
unjust or are contrary to established public policy.
II A.

See, infra,

This is especially true in light of the fact that Plaintiff

admitted that the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous.
Cf., Freund, at 370.

Therefore, the trial court was correct in

determining that the contracts terms are enforceable as written
and Defendant is entitled to indemnity as a matter of law.
II
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT IS NOT PROCEDURALLY OR SUBSTANTIVELY
UNCONSCIONABLE•
For the first time on appeal, Plaintiff raises arguments
regarding the unconscionability of the indemnity agreement under
two theories; procedural and substantive unconscionability.

For

this reason, the Court need not address the theories as not being
presented to the court below.

However, even if the theories are
18

applicable, they do not have factual support in the record below
and judgment was, nonetheless, properly granted by the district
court.
A.

Substantive Unconscionability.

Substantive unconscionability deals with the nature or basis
of the agreement itself and whether it is contrary to accepted
mores of commercial conduct or public policy.
Management, at 1041.

See, Resource

The court in Resource Management, held,

"although the right to contract freely on terms which establish and
allocate risks between the contracting parties is fundamental,
courts nonetheless recognize some limits to the extent to which a
party may be compelled to perform an unconscionable duty."
1040.

Id. at

Risk shifting is recognized to be a part of every bargain

and the indemnity provisions in general are recognized as valid and
enforceable under Utah law.

Freund, at 370.

As the court in

Resource Management, stated, "virtually all contracts involve the
assessment of risks."

Resource Management, at 1043.

Therefore, in examining substantive unconscionability, courts
will look at the time of the execution of the contract to determine
if the "contract was so unfair and oppressive in its mutual
obligations as to shock the conscience."

Id. at 1044.

The

appellate court will consider the contract unconscionable only if
the "terms are ,so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to
19

the mores and business practices in place.'" Resource Management,
at 1042, (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts §128, at 551 (1963))•
Instead of presenting any evidence that the terms of the
indemnity agreement itself are unacceptable or even frowned on in
the scaffolding rental industry, Plaintiff merely asserts that, on
its face, the document is contrary to public policy announced in
the Liability Reform Act. See, Plaintiff's Brief, Argument II, pp.
15-20.

Therefore,

Plaintiff

implicitly

concedes

that

the

commercial mores of the industry accept and condone the practice of
indemnity agreements.
Plaintiff's public policy argument also fails as a matter of
law because the Appellate Courts of this state have expressly held
that indemnity contracts involving such legislatively detailed
areas as workers' compensation are acceptable.
370.

Risk allocation by contract

See, Freund, at

is especially valid

in a

commercial setting. See, Freund, at 370; Gordon v. CRS Consulting
Engineers Inc.. 820 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Pickover, at
666

(the court notes the current trend to relax the strict

construction rule of indemnity agreements in commercial settings).
In his Brief, Plaintiff merely states that the risk imposed by
the contract is unfair in light of the Liability Reform Act.

In

making the assertion, Plaintiff ignores Utah law that recognizes
express indemnity provisions despite legislative foreclosure of
20

common law indemnity after the passage of the Liability Reform Act.
See, generally, Freund, at 370; Gordon, at 494. Plaintiffs claim
of substantive unconscionability must fail.

The district court

properly granted judgment by applying the indemnity agreement
according to its plain terms.
B.

Procedural Unconscionability.

Plaintiff
agreement

also

asserts

constitute

the circumstances

procedural

of the rental

unconscionability,

excusing

performance of the contract. Plaintiff's entire focus on appeal is
the lack of bargaining which took place over the terms of the
contract and that Plaintiff never intended to indemnify Defendant.
See, Plaintiff's Brief, Argument I, pp. 9-15.

Howeverf in the

court below, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment with any admissible evidence upon which this Court
can state that the conduct of the parties left Plaintiff unable to
anticipate the effect of the indemnity agreement or that the
parties

should

not

be

bound

by

the

agreement

they

signed.

Plaintiff merely concludes the indemnity provision was hidden in
the contract and unknown to Plaintiff.

R. 87, Disputed Fact. no.

4.
The court in Resource Management, pointed to several factors
that

could

be considered

grounds

for a claim of procedural

unconscionability, none of which exist in this case. The first was
21

the relative bargaining power of the parties.
Management, at 1047.

See Resource

This topic has been disposed of in the

discussion of the bargaining powers in establishing a prima facie
case of adhesion contracts.
Second,

Resource

See, supra. Argument I, A. 1.

Management,

addresses

and

forecloses

Plaintiff's claims that his failure to read or understand the
contract's terms somehow excuses performance.

Plaintiff would go

so far as to impose upon the Defendant the duty to explain each
clause of a contract to ensure the other party's understanding and
assent.

See, Plaintiff's Brief at 9-15.

Plaintiff's cited

authority from treatises and other jurisdictions is not supported
by express Utah law on the subject of the relative duties of the
parties and clear contract language.

The Utah Supreme Court

clearly stated in Resource Management, "one party to a contract
does not have a duty to ensure that the other has a complete and
accurate understanding of all the terms embodied in a written
contract."

Id. at 1047. Moreover, each party is obligated to read

and understand a document upon which he places his signature. Id.
He cannot complain latter that his ignorance or the fact that he
didn't read the document excuses performance.

See, Resource

Management, at 1047-48.
Contrary to Plaintiff's arguments, Defendant is under no
obligation to point out each of the terms of the contract or make
22

sure that the Plaintiff is apprised of each provision and all of
the potential consequences of his signing the contract.

The

parties are assumed to be capable of reading and understanding the
document and it is incumbent upon each person signing a contract to
be aware of what they are affixing their signature to and the
effect it will have.

Id.

Plaintiff somehow attempts to argue that his own failure to
assent to the contract or read or notice the indemnity provision
somehow can serve to create a voidable condition. Plaintiff cannot
claim of lack of assent when he asserts that he lacked intent
based, in part, on his failure to read the document. See, Resource
Management. at 1048.
Next, the court in Resource Management, addressed whether or
not the party had "meaningful choice" in entering the bargain. Id.
at 1048. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument in that case,
stating that the purchaser had the "trump card" because he was free
to "assent to the deal, to negotiate modifications of its terms, or
simply walk away."

Id. at 1048. Plaintiff here was in a similar

bargaining position. Plaintiff was the party approaching Defendant
Savage with the money to rent equipment. Plaintiff, not Defendant,
held the final word regarding whether or not he would rent from
Defendant. Plaintiff's failure to advance evidence that he held no
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meaningful choice but to rent under Defendant's terms defeats his
claim of procedural unconscionability as a matter of law*
Finally, procedural unconscionability may also be shown by the
fact that the terms of the agreement are "hidden in a maze of fine
print and minimized by deceptive sales practices."

Id* at 1048.

However, where the Plaintiff has admitted that the terms themselves
are clear and unambiguous, he cannot justly complain that the
provision was hidden from him.

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot claim

the term was hidden where he also admits he initialed that he had
read the entire agreement.

R. 83A.

The court in Resource

Management, stated:
A person who, having the capacity and an opportunity to read
a contract, is not misled as to its contents and who sustains
no confidential relationship to the other party cannot void
the contract on the ground of mistake if he signs it without
reading it, at least in the absence of special circumstances
excusing his failure to read it. If the contract is plain and
unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound thereby.
Id. at 1047. Plaintiff offers no evidence that the Plaintiff was
unaware of the provision after reading the contract.

He merely

concludes that the language was hidden without any support in the
record.

See, supra. Statement of Facts, 2 (3) and (4); R. 87.

It is undisputed that paragraph 15 of the agreement in this
case was set forth on the back page in larger differentiated type.
It is undisputed that on the front page, the text referring the
reader to the indemnity provisions was set out in capital letters
24

of contrasting red type.

Further, Plaintiff initialed the front

page of the document, indicating that he had read and understood
the agreement and all provisions contained on both the back and
front pages of the contract.

R. 78.

As in Resource Management,

"this is a far cry from those cases where fine print, complex
terminology, and presentation of contract form on a take it or
leave

it

basis

unconscionability."

constitute

the

basis

for

a

finding

of

Id. at 1049. Plaintiff failed to forward any

fact indicating that he read the contract but failed to notice the
provision because of its size, location or emphasis.

Nor did

Plaintiff assert the terms of the contract were too complex to
understand.
was

Plaintiff asserts only that after suing Defendant he

surprised

Defendant.

to

find

out that

he had

agreed

to indemnify

Plaintiffs claim is not based on any disputed fact,

and his intent, or lack thereof is irrelevant at this point.
The trial court was entirely within the bounds of propriety to
determine as a matter of law that the contract was plain and
unambiguous.

Plaintiff therefore failed to raise a genuine issue

of fact that the contract was made in procedurally unconscionable
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The court was correct in ruling that Plaintiff had failed to
make out a prima facie case of adhesion contract in this matter.
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Plaintiff failed to show any fact indicating that he occupied a
disparate bargaining position. He also failed to show any evidence
that

the

contract

was

made

on

a

take-it-or-leave-it-basis.

Further, by admitting that the document
unambiguous,

Plaintiff

may

itself is plain and

not void the plain

terms

of the

indemnity agreement even if it is otherwise found to be an adhesion
contract.
Finally, Plaintiff's failure to show that he occupied an
unequal

bargaining

unconscionability

position

and

is

adhesion.

fatal
Even

to
if

his
the

claims

of

doctrines

of

unconscionability and adhesion are applicable, Plaintiff failed to
show any evidence that the contract was either procedurally or
substantively unconscionable.
Indemnity contracts are an acceptable means of risk allocation
between parties in Utah, especially in a commercial

setting.

Further, Plaintiff failed to show any colorable evidence that the
conduct of the parties or the contract itself were unfair or
procured in an improper manner.
The trial court was correct in finding that Plaintiff failed
to

raise

evidence

that

the

contract

was

one

of

adhesion.

Therefore, Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and to have the plain terms of the indemnity agreement enforced as
written.

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
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day of January, 1995.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN
BRADLEY R. HELSTEN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Savage Scaffold & Equipment
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IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATB OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

Bruce A. Boyd,
Plaintiff,

CASE
vs

NO: 930902896 PI

JUDGE MICHAEL R* MURPHY

J. R, Simplot Company, a
Nevada corporation, and Savage
Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Defendant

Savage

has moved

indemnity contract with plaintiff.

for Summary

Judgment

on its

There is no evidence that the

scaffolding was leased on a take-it-or-leave-it

basis or that

plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous bargaining position.

As a

consequence, there is no evidence to support a legal conclusion
that the contract or the provision in question are contracts of
adhesion.

See Sys tern Concents. Inc.. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421 (Utah

1983).
The indemnity provision in question is clear and unambiguous.
It therefore overcomes any judicial antipathy to such indemnity
provisions.

BOYD V. SIMPLOT

For

PAGE 1VN0

MINUTE ENTRY

the foregoing reasons, defendant Savage's Motion for

Sunmary Judgment is granted.
DATED this

P__ day of September, 1993.

_B
Michael R. MuTphy
District Court Judge

BOYD V. SIMPLOT
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60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-1104
Mark D. Dunn
DUNN&DUNN
230 South 500 East, Suite 460
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
David R. King
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Defendant Simplot
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Scott W. Christenscn
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorney for Defendant Savage Scaffold
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
David W. Cantrill
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING
P. O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho
83701
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Third Judicial District

6 1993

OCT

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE A. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
V •

i

ORDER

J
4

J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, a
;
Nevada corporation, and
:
SAVAGE SCAFFOLD & EQUIPMENT,
INC., a Utah corporation,
: Civil No. 93 0902896PI
i Judge Michael R. Murphy
Defendants.
Defendant, Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. 's Motion for
Summary Judgment on its indemnity claim, having come before the
court for oral arguments on Monday, September 13, 1993, the court
having heard oral arguments and, having reviewed the memoranda and
having received supplemental memoranda on September

15, 1993;

therefore, being fully advised in the premises
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that for the

reasons contained in the Minute Entry Savage Scaffold & Equipment,
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on the indemnity provision is
granted, Bruce A. Boyd must indemnify Savage Scaffold & Equipment
Inc. for his claims presented in this action and in the pending

00151

^3oc/oz5%
action of Robert J. Kane. Jr. and Beverly Kane v. J.R. Simplot
Company and Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc.. currently pending in
the Federal District Court, Central Division, State of Utah, Civil
No.: 92-C-234S.

Oct

DATED this _ _ y
^ _ day of September, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

U.Jmi

MICHAEL R. MURP
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVEB-^AS T6-F0RM:

MARK DALTON DUNN
Attorney for Plaintiff
93-389.10
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, Ste. 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1104
Mark D. Dunn
DUNN & DUNN
230 South 500 East, #460
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorneys for Defendant J, R. Simplot Company:
David R. King, Esq.KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Daniel A, Miller, Esq.
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY
999 Main Street
P.O. Box 27
Boise, Idaho 83707
David W. Cantrill, Esq.
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING
1423 Tyrell Lane
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701
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